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Abstract
In this comment we point out that the ’quantum dialogue’ (Phys. Lett. A (in press))
can be eavesdropped under the intercept-and-resend attack. We also give a revised
control mode to detect this attack.
PACS : 03.67.-a, 03.65.Ta, 89.70.+c
Very recently, an entanglement-based protocol for two people to simultaneously exchange their
messages has been proposed by Ba An Nguyen [1].The original idea has been presented in Ref. [2,3]
earlier. In Ref.[1], Nguyen claims that his protocol is asymptotically secure against the disturbance
attack, the intercept-and-resend attack and the entangle-and-measure attack. In this comment, we
show this protocol is insecure under the intercept-and-resend attack and we give a revised protocol
to detect this attack at the same time.
In Nguyen’s protocol [1], Bob first produces a large enough number of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
(EPR) pairs, all in the state |Ψ0,0〉ht = 1√
2
(| ↓〉h| ↑〉t + | ↑〉h| ↓〉t, where h stands for ”home”,
t for ”travel” while | ↓〉 and | ↑〉 characterize two degrees of freedom of a qubit. Bob encodes
his bits (kn, ln) (kn, ln ∈ {0, 1}) by applying an operation Ckn,ln on the state |Ψ0,0〉ht, keeps one
qubit (home qubit) with him and sends another (travel qubit) to Alice. Then Bob lets Alice know
that. Alice confirms Bob that she received a qubit. Alice encodes her bits (in, jn) (in, jn ∈ {0, 1})
by performing an operation Cin,jn on this travel qubit, then sends it back to Bob. When Bob
receives this encoded travel qubit he performs a Bell basis measurement on this qubit pair and
waits for Alice to tell him that was a run in message mode (MM) or in control mode (CM). In
MM run, Bob decode Alice’s bits and announces his Bell basis measurement result (xn, yn) to let
Alice decode his bits. In CM run, Alice reveals her encoding value to Bob to check the security of
their dialogue.
However this security checking can not detect Eve’s intercept-and-resend attack. Let us suppose
Eve prepares a number of EPR pairs in one of the four Bell states. Then Eve intercepts the travel
qubit which has encoded Bob’s bits (kn, ln) and replaces it with a qubit in her prepared EPR pair.
She sends this fake travel qubit to Alice and retains another with her. Although Alice confirms
Bob that she received a qubit, she can not distinguish this qubit whether it is the original qubit
or the fake qubit. Alice encodes her bits (in, jn) on this fake qubit and sends it back to Bob.
Then Eve intercepts this encoded fake qubit and performs a Bell basis measurement on it and
the retained qubit. Since Eve knows the state of her prepared EPR pair, she can conclude Alice’s
bits (in, jn) and the encoding operation Cin,jn . And then Eve performs a same operation as Alice
2on the original travel qubit and sends it back to Bob. Consequently, if it is a MM run, after
Bob announces publicly his Bell basis measurement result (xn, yn), Eve can deduce Bob’s bits:
kn = |xn − in|, ln = |yn − jn|. Hence, in the MM run, Eve eavesdrops completely the contents
of the Bob and Alice’s dialogue. Actually, Eve replaces Alice to perform the encoding operation
Cin,jn on the travel qubit , as a result, when Alice publicly reveals the value (in, jn) for Bob to
check eavesdropping, both in = |xn − kn| and jn = |yn − ln| still hold. Accordingly, in the CM
run the legitimate users, Alice and Bob, can not detect this intercept-and-resend eavesdropping.
Now we give a revised control mode (RCM) to detect this intercept-and-resend eavesdropping.
At first, we define the four Bell states as follows.
|Ψ0,0〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉|1〉+ |1〉|0〉) = 1√
2
(|+〉|+〉 − |−〉|−〉), (1)
|Ψ0,1〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉|1〉 − |1〉|0〉) = 1√
2
(|+〉|−〉 − |−〉|+〉), (2)
|Ψ1,0〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉|0〉+ |1〉|1〉 = 1√
2
(|+〉|+〉+ |−〉|−〉), (3)
|Ψ1,1〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉|0〉 − |1〉|1〉) = 1√
2
(|+〉|−〉+ |−〉|+〉), (4)
where|+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉).
At the beginning, Bob prepares some EPR pairs in the state |Ψ0,0〉. Suppose that
Alice’s message={(i1, j1), (i2, j2, ..., (iN , jN )}
Bob’s message={(k1, l1), (k2, l2, ..., (kN , lN)}
Bob encodes his bits (kn, ln) on the EPR pair |Ψ0,0〉 by performing an operation Ckn,ln on one
qubit. Then Bob sends one qubit to Alice (travel qubit) and keeps another with him (home qubit).
Alice confirms Bob that she received a qubit. In the RCM run, Alice and Bob check eavesdropping
by following procedure: (a)Alice chooses randomly one of the two sets of measuring basis (MB),
i.e., ßz = {|0〉, |1〉} and ßx = {|+〉, |−〉}, to measure the travel qubit. (b) Alice tells Bob which
MB she has chosen and the outcomes of her measurement. (c) Bob uses the same measuring basis
as Alice to measure the home qubit and checks with the results of Alice. If no eavesdropping
exists, their results should be correlated according to Eq.(1-4). As an example, if kn = 0 and
ln = 1, Bob applies the operation C0,1 on one qubit in the EPR pair |Ψ0,0〉, then the state |Ψ0,0〉 is
changed into |Ψ0,1〉. If there is no Eve in line the results must be completely opposite, i.e., if Bob
obtains |0〉 (|+〉), then Alice gets |1〉 (|−〉). By this revised control mode, any intercept-and-resend
eavesdropping can be detected.
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